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Product Liability and Disclaimers in West

Virginia
Reflections on Payne and Williams
WLLAED D. LORENSEN*

Two recent decisions by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals have given unusual vitality to the contractual disclaimer
of product liability. To some degree these decisions are now
obsolete. To some degree they are not. The aim of this paper
is to consider these rulings and reflect upon some of the many
problems raised by them and the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In the first of the two cases, Payne v. Valley Motor Sales,' the
purchaser of a new truck sued his seller to recover for the loss
sustained when the truck ran off the road and was demolished.
The plaintiff buyer's theory was that the truck was not merchantable, i.e. not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such a truck
would be used. Recovery was denied in the Supreme Court of
Appeals on the basis of a disclaimer in the sales contract. Noting
"two distinct and conflicting lines of authority"2 the court adopted
the view which recognized the validity of the disclaimer. The
court embraced this view because it deemed it to be in accord
with the majority of jurisdictions in this country3 and also because
it was deemed consistent with the policy of freedom of contract.'
Moreover, the court noted that the contrary view which refused
to recognize the validity of such disclaimers grew from the famous
Henningsen' case and was then to be found only in states which
had enacted the Uniform Sales Act. The court suggested that the
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act afforded public policy foundations upon which a rigorous investigation of the validity of a disclaimer could be based. Since West Virginia never adopted the
Uniform Sales Act, the court reasoned it was additionally justified
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
' 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962).
2 Id. at 1070, 124 S.E.2d at 626.
" Id. at 1074, 124 S.E.2d at 628.
4 See Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HAnv. L. REv.
318, 325 n. 50 (1963).
5 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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in refusing to consider the implied warranty as "a child of the law"
and therefore deserving of special protection from disclaimers."
The second decision, Williams v. Chrysler Corp., raised a broader
range of issues. In that case the litigation originated as an action
by a passenger against the buyer and manufacturer of a new
automobile. The defendant buyer cross-claimed against manufacturer on the tort theory of MacPherson v. Buick8 that a supplier
of chattels owes a duty of reasonable care towards the ultimate
user of such chattels. The Williams case clearly was premised upon
a fault theory of liability-the manufacturer was liable because of
negligence in the manufactuer of the automobile. The earlier
Payne case had involved strictly a contract theory in which fault
or negligence was immaterial. The claim of negligence against the
remote manufacturer has been a means of avoiding the privity
limitations of a contract based warranty action which, when narrowly confined, permits a buyer to sue only his immediate vendor.'
The interesting point of the Williams case is that the court again
resolved the issue on the disclaimer provision. The opinion outlines
the plaintiff's theory, notes its heavy reliance upon a recent article
by the respected torts authority Dean Prosser,'" acknowledges the
adoption of a MacPhersontype liability in West Virginia cases involving medicine" and chewing tobacco,' 2 and notes the assumption by two federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that West Virginia
would apply the MacPherson theory to automobile cases." After
this lengthy recitation, the opinion leaves the issue of the producer's
liability suspended with the suggestion that the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code may have affected the law significantly.
The Williams appeal was then quickly dispatched in one brief
paragraph by resort to the disclaimer provision. The language of
the dispositive paragraph bears close consideration:
6 The court in Payne also ruled that the evidence did not support the jury's
verdict. Thus the ruling on the validity of the disclaimer is an alternative
holding.

137 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1964).
8 217 N.Y. 387, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7

9See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citidel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
10 Ibid.

I' Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1901).
'2Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d
898 (1939).
13 Caprini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954);

General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1943).
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"However, there can be no doubt that this language of the
express warranty between the plaintiff and the defendant
clearly and conclusively precludes the plaintiff from maintaining this action: "* * *this warranty being expressly in lieu

of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other
obligations or liability on its part. * * *" (Italics supplied.)
The rule seems to be well established in this jurisdiction that
a party to a valid contract may in advance limit its liability
so long as one of the parties thereto is not a common carrier
or where the negligent act which was in futuro exempted did
not amount to wilful, wanton or gross misconduct. Dunham
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 85 W. Va. 425, 102 S.E.
113; Zouch v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. 36 W. Va. 524, 15 S.E.
185; and authorities cited in the opinions of those cases. This
is the sixth syllabus point of the Dunham case: 'All just and
reasonable conditions and regulations, prescribed in a contract * * * are binding on the addressee, whether his action

to recover damages for breach of duty be in tort, or in
assumpsit on the contract.' . ..
The court overstates the case by extracting a "well established"
rule from Dunham and Zouch which supports the result in Williams. These two cases are quite distinguishable and their holdings
could easily have survived an opposite result in Williams."5 But
even if Zouch and Dunham are to be taken to suggest a doctrine
applicable in cases such as Williams, the rule suggested would be
quite different than that applied in Williams. Note that the very
language quoted from the Dunham syllabus starts with the admonition: "All reasonable and just conditions. . .

."

A more recent

utterance by the West Virginia court, not cited in the Williams
case, is of like tenor: "[T]o relieve a party from liability for his
own negligence by contract, the language to that effect must be
137 S.E.2d at 321 (Italics in original.)
IsDunham and Zouch both involved contractual limitations of remedy by
common carriers. Both involved cases where the person dealing with the carrier
could have chosen a higher range of remedies by paying a moderately higher
fee for the service involved. These cases did not rule, then, as a matter of law,
on the conditions under which a person or business entity not a common carrier
could totally disclaim liability for negligence. It should be noted additionally
that the court in Dunham specifically acknowledged it was applying federal
law, not state law. Because Congress had preempted control of interstate
telegraph communications, the court recognized it was no more free to employ
state law in Dunham than the West Virginia legislature would be free today
to abolish the Interstate Commerce Commission.
14
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clear and definite..." 6 But this caution which could moderate
the harsh effects of the disclaimer appears now to have been
abandoned. In Williams, the standard which is stated and applied
is one that gives effect to a disclaimer so long as (1) the party
disclaiming is not a common carrier; and (2) the conduct immunized does not involve wilful, wanton or gross misconduct.
Simply restated, it would seem that Williams countenances disclaiming anything but liability for criminal conduct by anyone
not a common carrier. This is not stretching Williams too far. The
language of the paragraph quoted above supports this analysis.
And more convincingly, what the court actually did in Williams
lends even more poignant support. In the paragraph just preceding
the one quoted above, the court remarked as follows about the
warranty and disclaimer provisions of the contract involved: "A
cursory examination of the warranty contained in the contract ...
is sufficient to reveal its restrictiveness and the necessity of giving
the ultimate owner of the vehicle protection of either a judicial
or legislative nature .... ." This concern for the necessity of
giving ultimate relief to the purchaser was not linked with the
moderating elements which were-prior to Williams-available under a still pliable, undeveloped and unsettled West Virginia law.
By noting this deceptiveness in the disclaimer and failing to connect
it with the available moderating elements which were so readily at
hand, the court tacitly underlined the harshness of the Williams
doctrine.
If support for such a callous doctrine is sought outside this state,
little help is to be found. A survey of various materials indicates
an absence of hard, fast rules. The omniscient encyclopedias speak
with unusual ambivalence. The notion there abounds that plastic
concepts of public policy or public interest may be employed to
restrict the operation of disclaimers. 8 The presence of "superior
bargaining power" may be enough to deny the advantaged party
his license to injure with impunity.' 9 "The law does not look with
favor" is a favorite phrase introducing a statement of the pervasive
animosity demonstrated towards such absolutions from fault.
16Bowlby-Harman Lumber Co. v. Commodore Service, Inc., 144 W. Va.
239, 248, 107 S.E.2d 602, 607 (1959).
17 137 S.E.2d at 231.
18 See, e.g. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 188 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 262 (1962).
19See Tyler v. Dowell, Inc. 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960); Tunkl v.
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
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Treatises in the area offer little in the way of a dogmatic rule, but
rather encourage a flexible, policy oriented approach."° Though
a nose count of recent case decisions regarding the efficacy of a
disclaimer shows a sizeable margin in favor of its validity, the
vast majority of these cases involve litigation between business
concerns-not between the relatively naive consumer and a giant
national corporation.2' Risk allocations between business men
could rationally be viewed differently than those arrangements
found in mass production contracts which the untutored citizen
accepts on faith.22 The unsettled nature of the legal doctrine in
this area is demonstrated in the contrary results reached recently
in California and New York. In California it was held that a
disclaimer executed at the time of admission to a hospital did not
bind the patient. 3 The New York court held a member of a health
club was bound by her waiver when she claimed for injuries
suffered while using a swimming facility provided under contract
with the club." A careful analysis of only the recent case law
in this area would run far beyond the limited undertaking of this
paper. This superficial survey has been tendered to demonstrate
that there is no settled, automatic rule which provides a simple
solution to the disclaimer issues as it was posed in the Williams
case. On the contrary, most authorities point to a judicial responsibility to weigh carefully the possibility of overreaching.
The immediate product of the Williams decision is a very harsh
doctrine but the callousness of this unconcern appears tempered
somewhat by the court's treating the case as a very transitory
affair. An obvious forecast of change emanates from a reference
to the impending effect of the Uniform Commercial Code. Noting
this, the court combined some language of the Payne case with a
sophisticated principle of statutory interpretation and tendered an
20 See 6A CoRnix, CoNRmAcrs § 1472 (1962); PaossEm, TORTS 456 (3d
ed. 1964).
21 A general survey of head notes indexed under the West Key Number,

Contracts 114, indicated about sixty decisions involving the validity of an

exculpatory clause in the period since 1956. About two-thirds of these notes
indicated
the clause was upheld.
22
This type of contract is becoming commonly known as the "contract of
adhesion." Credit for originating this phrase is given to Edwin W. Patterson
in his article, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HaRv. L. REv. 198
(1919). See, Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract,43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943).
'3 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 441
(1963).
24

(1961).

Ciafolo v. Tic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925
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intriguing prophecy that better times lay ahead for the consumer:
"Even if the provisions of the [Uniform Commercial Code]...
were not directly applicable, we would be among those states
'wherein the doctrine of public policy was used in connection with
allowing implied warranties to be considered' as stated in the
Payne case. . . .""2 Two important points emerge from this

sentence. First, the court indicates that policy implications arise
from the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code which radiate
beyond its express terms. Second, the court suggests that these
policy implications bode well for the consumer. These points are
not mere loose conjecture. They deserve serious attention. They
are pivotal remarks furnishing the most rational link between the
court's expressed concern for giving a buyer "ultimate relief' and
its cursory and uncritical acceptance of the efficacy of the disclaimer. The sentence gives a "things are darkest before the dawn"
tone to the opinion which tends both to apologize for the result
in Williams and suggest better times ahead.
The suggestion that the adoption of the Commercial Code may
affect issues which do not fall expressly within its terms intimates
that the court is ready to embrace a most sophisticated position in
regard to the use of legislative materials. Perceptive commentators
have long criticized courts for being too much of an opposite
mind. 6 There can be no doubt that case oriented law teaching
and legal research have deeply imbedded the idea that cases are
read for broad principles while statutes state only narrow rules.
Cases are to be reasoned from. Statutes are to be reasoned around.
But this attitude should not obtain, the court has now indicated,
so far as the Commercial Code is concerned. There may be a case
for treating the Code specially in this regard,"' but the concept
of employing statutes generally as sources of principle and policy
is a healthy one deserving wide application. But it should be
recognized that the challenge of this approach is a rigorous one.
It demands a thorough study of statutory materials and a careful

25 137 S.E.2d at 231.
26

E.g. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HvAnv. L. REv.
4 (1936); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAIv. L. REv. 383 (1908);
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HAmv. LECAL EssAYs 213 (Pound
ed. 1934).
27 Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 CoLumT.L. REv. 88 (1965).
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articulation of the principles which they support.2" Judicious use
of this method of policy determination eschews loose and haphazard
generalizations. It is in this vein that difficult problems arise from
the second point made in the court's prophecy in Williams.
Broadly speaking, the relevant general policy which will flow
from the adoption of the Commercial Code is one of enhanced
protection for the buyer of goods. So goes the obvious forecast
of Williams. And this policy in turn involves two broad issues:
(1) Does any obligation of quality extend from the manufacturer
to the ultimate buyer and (2) may this obligation be abolished or
limited by disclaimer. Whether the court's intimation of change
applies to both of these issues is conjectural. The positioning of
the statement in the case tends to indicate that the question of
whether liability exists falls within the forecast. The language
seems a part of the general conclusion of the discussion of the
MacPherson issue. It seems to be advanced as a justification for
leaving that issue unresolved. It appears, therefore, to bear upon
the threshold question of whether any liability exists at all. But
it is language from the Payne case that is called upon to flesh out
the court's statement and this would seem to draw the disclaimer
issue also within the range of the prophecy. The Payne case
involved only the efficacy of the disclaimer and this inverting of
the argument advanced in Payne suggests a different doctrine may
now be in store for the disclaimer. At this point, it seems fair to
assume that both issues are open for fresh consideration.
We start with the issue of whether any liability extends from a
manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser. The forecast of the
Williams case refers to the "doctrine of public policy" and links
this with the peculiar status of the implied warranty as a "child
of the law" under the Uniform Sales Act. Since the Uniform Sales
Act provisions regarding implied warranties have been carried
forward to the Uniform Commercial Code and that act has been
adopted in West Virginia, an indiscriminate projection of Williams
might suggest the law's concern with protecting the consumer has
come to occupy that ephemeral state which, in terms of the
metaphor, makes the implied warranty a "child of the law." In
deed, we might assume that in response to a new legislative policy
2

8 For a beautiful example of mixing statute and case rules to construct a
general policy which is employed to dispose of a difficult question see Webb v.
County Court, 113 W. Va. 474, 168 S.E. 760 (1933).
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manifested by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
West Virginia is now poised, ready to plunge headlong into a
doctrine of absolute liability for manufacturers, suppliers and
sellers. Shere silliness of course.
To disentangle sense from silliness, we must return to the Payne
decision. The court there employed the legislative policy argument
as a convenient means of distinguishing the Henningsen decision.
Admittedly, the New Jersey court, in there holding the disclaimer
invalid, did point to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act as a
manifestation of a legislative policy of consumer concern. But in
the totallity of that opinion, this point was hardly a telling argument. It was a tolerable bit of fluff in an energetic opinion that
dealt head on with a difficult problem. To turn this point into the
distinguishing feature is to circumvent the vigorous and wide ranging arguments base on policy considerations. If we are to take the
Payne distinction of Henningsen seriously, we should scurry about
to study the more than sixty other uniform acts which have not been
adopted in West Virginia and distill from those heady spirits
a telling reservoir of legislative unpolicy.29 This would require
only a total disdain for the realities of the legislative process.
Clearly the failure of West Virginia to enact the Uniform Sales
Act was not a legitimate reason for ignoring the elaborate arguments in Henningsen which condemned the unfairness and deceptiveness of the new car warranty disclaimer. Those arguments
stand on their own. They are not servient to the euphamistic ]able
hung on the implied warranty. And now to do a judicial about
face upon the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not correct the default of the Payne case. Rather, it compounds it.
Loose generalizations about the legislative policy implications
of the Sales Act become the more misleading when the narrower
issue here concerned is posed in terms of the successor Commercial
Code. The crux of the immediate issue involves not the general
problem of the quality of the implied warranty, or what it involves.
The issue is who it involves. And here, the tribunal that intends to
rest on some portentious implication of legislative policy lurking in
the Uniform Commercial Code is in for a very injudicious prat fall.
29

See

NAT'L

CoNF. ConMRs

ON

UNnEoRM

STATE LAws,

HANDBOOK,

chart at 302 (1964).
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On the very point at issue here-the manufacturer's liability to
the ultimate consumer-the Commercial Code is consciously neutral.
Admittedly, the Code does make one slight enlargement of the
usual range of warranty protection. In section 2-318, warranties
are extended to members of the family and household of the
immediate purchaser and to guests in his home." The sponsors
of the Code recognized that this section approaches a very volatile
area and in a comment stated:
"This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household and guests of the purchasor.
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
sellor's warranties given to his buyer who resells, extends to
other persons in the distributive chain." (Emphasis added.)3"
In contrast to this consciously neutral position, the Virginia legislature abandoned the uniform provision at this point and substituted the following:
"Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be
no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer or
seller of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty,
express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff
did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff
was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods; . . ."32
The glaring contrast between this provision and the uniform section adopted in West Virginia and other Code states33 demonstrates
beyond question the distinction between the neutral position of the
Commercial Code and the consumer-prone attitude of the Virginia
law.
The manufacturer's liability to his ultimate consumer poses a
legal issue buffeted by very turbulent and unsettled doctrines at the
present. 4 The food cases have given West Virginia law a start
30
31
32
33

W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 2, § 318 (Michie Supp. 1964).
UonMoR COMMCIALr. CODE § 2-318, comment 3 (1962 official ed.)

CODE OF VA. § 8.2-318 (1965 added vol.)
See UNmO -m Comrmmcrm. CODE PmANENT EDrroIL&. BD. BEP. No.

2, 39 4(1965).
USee, e.g. RESTATEMrNT (SEcoND) TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. I0
1964)- Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition
for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. LJ. 343 (1965).
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in this area,3" the exploding bottle cases have added an interesting
supplement.36 But, contrary to the implications of the Williams
case, there is no nascent legislative policy to be devined from the
Uniform Commercial Code that will provide the easy answer to
this problem.
While the Code is in fact silent on the issue of the manufacturer's
liability, it does provide guides in regard to disclaimers.3" Note
that the Code would expressly apply to the issues raised in the
Payne case-a suit between the immediate buyer and the seller.
In such situations, section 2-316 demands that the disclaimer
mention "merchantability" and be "conspicuous" in the written
contract.3" From this section it is possible to draw a general principle applicable to other cases which do not fall within the express
provisions of the Code. Such a principle would demand that one
seeking to disclaim a responsibility which the law would ordinarily
imply is obligated to employ prominently and conspicuously language which is well suited to call attention to the disclaimer provision. One who seeks to avoid fair obligations should assume a
special burden of calling this modification to the attention of the
other party in understandable terms. Under such a principle, it
would be appropriate in cases such as Williams to demand that
the language mention negligence or fault and refer specifically to
injury to the person and to property-including the vehicle being
sold before the disclaimer language should be given effect. Of
course, the prominence or conspicuousness of the provision in the
terms of written contract in general must be relevant. Burying
such disclaimers in language well calculated to escape attention
in a mass of form provisions written in incomprehensible jargon
makes a farce of freedom of contract. Such practices smack of
deception. The broad doctrines of unconscionability39 and good
faith40 which permeate the Code are certainly apt. The specific
provisions relating to disclaimers in the Sales Article of the Code
See notes 10 and 11 supra.
See Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 144 W. Va. 465, 109 S.E.2d
489 (1959).
48 Unfortunately, the provisions relating to disclaimers are not among the
most clearly drawn in the Code. See, Lorenson, The Uniform Commercial Code
Sales Article Compared With West Virginia Law-I, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 142,
35
36

168-73
3 8 (1962).
39
40

W. VA.
W. VA.
W. VA.

CODE,
CODE,
CODE,

ch. 46, art. 2, § 316 (Michie Supp. 1964).
ch. 46, art. 2, § 302 (Michie Supp. 1964).
ch. 46, art. 2, § 203 (Michie Supp. 1964).
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illustrate the development of explicit working rules stemming from
these general principles. The Code can provide legislative material
for the formulation of a major premise of public policy which
would condemn the deceptive disclaimer.
This leaves what must be considered the most surprising twist
that might be drawn from the Willians case. Implicit in that
decision-and unmolested by the adoption of the Commercial Code
-is the recognition of a contractual relationship between the ultimate purchaser and the manufacturer where the manufacturer
voluntarily grants an express warranty. The consequences that
flow from this under the Commercial Code are something to behold.
It was the existence of this contract that prevented Williams from
pressing his tort claim. The extension of the express warranty
under such circumstances is a contract made in connection with
the sale of goods. It should now be subject to the Code provisions
relating to express warranties4' and limitations of remedy.42 Particularly, section 2-719 would be pertinent. This section provides
that an agreement limiting the remedy under a sales contract to
the acceptance of repair or replacement of defective parts or goods
is generally valid. But this is subject to two very important exceptions. The first of these exceptions, found in subsection (2),
makes the limitation ineffective if the "exclusive or limited remedy"
fails of "its essential purpose." The comments to this section indicate that what it intended by the phrase "essential purpose" is
the "substantial value of the bargain" to either party.4" To the
buyer who loses substantially the entire value of a new automobile
because of the defect of some part of inconsequential cost, the
"essential purpose" of the remedy has rather obviously failed.
Under such circumstances, the broad, general relief of the Code
would become available.44 The second exception, found in subsection (3), focuses expressly on consequential damages, thus
venturing expressly into the potentially costly realm of personal
injuries. The second exception condemns any limitation on consequential damages which is "unconscionable." Excluding personal
injury damages in connection with the sale of consumer goodssuch as family automobiles-is declared prima facia unconscionable.
The general approach of the second exception is aimed at providing
41 W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 2, § 313 (Michie Supp. 1964).
42
W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 2, §§ 718,719 (Michie Supp. 1964).
43
UN o M Cov MEcr.
CODE § 2-719, comment 1 (official ed. 1962).
44
W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 2, §§ 711, 714, 715 (Michie Supp. 1964).
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the court with some leeway in dealing with unusually harsh
limitations of remedies. The special concern for personal injury
in consumer goods is demonstrated by obligating the party seeking
the benefit of the limitation to demonstrate a special justification.
Just how this might be done is left to future consideration. At
this point, it should be noted that the balance of advantage has
shifted clearly and emphatically to the buyer.
The Payne and Williams decisions fail to establish a pattern
upon which an articulate and well reasoned body of product
liability law may be constructed. As a combination, they seem to
compound their own weaknesses more than they buttress their
points of strength. The "child of the law" meaphor was in
Payne an innocuous afterthought, an almost facitious make-weight
argument. Resurrected in Williams, this phrase now appears destined to serve as a foundation for future developments in the
field of products liability law. It is hoped that this estimate
may prove wrong. It would be better that Williams be quickly
forgotten as a humorless joke, dimly considered in the shadow
of portentious-but misunderstood-legislative change.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol67/iss4/3

12

